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NOTES
American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government
Development: A Conventional Analysis in an
Unconventional Setting
When the Lord saw that Moses had turned aside to look, he called to
him out of the bush, "Moses, Moses." And Moses answered, "Yes, I am
here." God said, "Come no nearer; take off your sandals; the place
where you are standing is holy ground."
- Exodus 3:1-6
[I]n the long run if the expansion is permitted, we will not be able
successfully to teach our people that this is a sacred place. If the ski
resort remains or is expanded, our people will not accept the view that
this is the sacred Home of the Kachinas. The basis of our existence as a
society will become a mere fairy tale to our people.
- Wilson v. Block1
INTRODUCTION

For centuries, American Indians have regarded specific lands as
essential to their livelihood, government, culture, and religion. Congress and the courts have at times recognized the important relationship between tribes and their lands. 2 Recognition has not always
coincided with protection; during the nineteenth century and part of
the twentieth century a series of governmental actions resulted in the
tribes surrendering title and possession to many of their ancestral
lands. 3 Recently, however, American Indians have become increasingly active litigants in a variety of contexts.4 In one set of cases, Indians challenged government development projects on public lands,
contending that because the projects interfered with Indian sacred
sites, they violated the free exercise clause. 5
1. 708 F.2d 735, 740 n.2 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, as originally enacted, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)); Indian Trade and Intercourse Act ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 330
(1793).
3. See, e.g., Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (current version
in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); Termination Act, ch. 303 §§ 1-12, 68 Stat. 250-52 (1954)
(repealed 1973).
4. For example, American Indians have asserted a1,1cient claims to their lands. See, e.g.,
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
5. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. This Note
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This Note focuses on the sacred lands cases6 and argues that courts
have improperly transferred conventional free exercise analysis to an
unfamiliar setting. As a result, these decisions fail to give adequate
consideration to sincere Indian religious interests, and seem to conflict
frequently with vital principles underlying the free exercise clause.
Part I outlines the development of the Supreme Court's current
tripartite approach to free exercise issues. Part II examines the application of this approach to a series of earlier cases in which Indian free
exercise claims did not involve sacred sites. Part III analyzes the sacred lands cases and concludes that they are inconsistent with both
mainstream free exercise cases and the earlier Indian religious cases.
After surveying possible legislative alternatives, Part IV offers recommendations for restructuring current free exercise analysis so that it
leads to fairer evaluation of sacred site issues.

I.

DEVELOPMENT OF FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE ANALYSIS

A. Early Free Exercise Clause Analysis
In its initial construction of the free exercise clause, the Supreme
Court drew a distinction between religious beliefs, which were protected, and religious actions, which were unprotected and therefore
subject to extensive government regulation. 7 While "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion ... [it] was ... free to
reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order." 8
In the 1940s, the Court began to move beyond this belief-action
distinction. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 9 a Jehovah's Witness was convicted for playing a record attacking organized religions on a busy
street corner, without first obtaining official approval. In reversing the
is restricted to a discussion of the free exercise clause and does not address establishment clause
issues raised in a few of the cases.
6. See United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985); Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct.
1971 (1987); Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D.
Alaska 1982), affd., 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 68 (1985); Crow v.
Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), affd., 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 977 (1983); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 Indian L. Rep. 3073 (D.D.C. 1981), affd. sub
nom. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1984); Se·
quoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), affd., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977),
affd., 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
7. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Supreme Court upheld conviction ofa
Mormon under polygamy statute, rejecting defendant's assertion that polygamy was a religious
belief protected by the free exercise clause).
8. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. See generally Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alterna·
tivesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 322; Riga, Yoder and Free Exercise, 6
J. L. & EDUC. 449, 456-57 (1977).
9. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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conviction, the Court stressed that actions as well as beliefs would now
be afforded some manner of free exercise protection, noting that:
[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to
preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom. 10

The impact of cases such as Cantwell on free exercise analysis was
unclear, however, since those cases simultaneously involved other important first amendment issues. 11 This problem was alleviated in Sherbert v. Verner, 12 where the Court confronted only a free exercise
claim. 13
B. Modern Approach to the Free Exercise Clause

1.

Sherbert v. Verner

In Sherbert v. Verner, 14 the Court indicated that many forms of
religiously based action would be entitled to free exercise protection,
and correspondingly, that the government would face stricter limits on
its ability to regulate such behavior. In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist was discharged from her job because she would not work on
Saturday, which was her Sabbath Day. Finding that appellant's religious reasons did not constitute "good cause" for her inability to
work, the state denied her unemployment benefits. 15
In holding that appellant's disqualification from benefits violated
her right to free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court enunciated a
two-step approach for analyzing free exercise claims. First, claimant
had to demonstrate that the state regulation or practice imposed a sub10. 310 U.S. at 303-04 (footnote omitted). See also Pepper, supra note 8, at 329.
11. See Pepper, supra note 8, at 327 (arguing that "these cases are too intricately entwined
with free speech, press and assembly considerations to assist significantly in a coherent, independent elaboration of the appropriate meaning of the free exercise clause"); Note, Religious
Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J.
350, 353 (1980).
12. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13. Two years before Sherbert, the Court addressed a distinct free exercise claim in Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld, orthodox Jewish merchants whose beliefs prevented them from conducting business on Saturday challenged the state's Sunday closing law.
They argued that the law infringed on their free exercise rights, since in forcing them to close on
both Saturday and Sunday it placed them at a financial disadvantage compared with their fellow
merchants. The Court rejected the claim, stressing that the burden on religious practices was
"indirect." 366 U.S. at 605-09. This indirect/direct analysis, however, seems to have been overruled by Sherbert. See text at note 19 infra.
14. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
15. 374 U.S. at 401.
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stantial burden on the exercise of her religion. 16 Second, the burden
was justified only if it was necessary to advance a "compelling state
interest" that outweighed the impaired free exercise rights. 17 Furthermore, the state had to show that there were no less restrictive means
which might serve its interests without impairing claimant's free exercise rights. 18
The Court found that appellant satisfied both steps of the analysis.
The state argued that since the unemployment statute did not explicitly compel appellant to work on Saturday, it placed only an indirect
burden on her religious practices. The Court held, however, that any
distinction between "direct" or "indirect" burdens was irrelevant.
Rather, a substantial burden on appellant's religion existed because
the ruling forced "her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand." 19
Moreover, the Court was unwilling to assess the state interests offered to justify the statute, noting that the evidence was insufficient to
show that persons would feign religious protest to Saturday work in
order to collect compensation. State concerns with avoiding fraud and
the disruption of scheduling were not the sort of "paramount interests" required to override appellant's religious interest. 20 The state
also failed to demonstrate that there were no less restrictive means for
attaining its goals. 2 1
2.

Wisconsin v. Yoder

Wisconsin v. Yoder 22 is one of the most significant recent free exercise cases. In Yoder, members of the Old Order Amish religion were
convicted under a state compulsory school attendance law when they
refused to send their children to public school after the eighth grade or
to enroll them in an alternative private school. 23 Following its analysis in Sherbert, the Court affirmed the state supreme court's reversal of
the convictions on free exercise grounds. 2 4
Before reaching the two-step analysis developed in Sherbert, how16. 374 U.S. at 403. See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
1058-59 (2d ed. 1983).
17. 374 U.S. at 406.
18. 374 U.S. at 407.
19. 374 U.S. at 404. The Court analogized this conditioning of benefits on violating one's
religious faith to the imposition of a fine on appellant for her Saturday worship. 374 U.S. at 404.
20. 374 U.S. at 407.
21. 374 U.S. at 407-08.
22. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
23. 406 U.S. at 207-08.
24. 406 U.S. at 234.

LAW
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ever, the Court established several threshold criteria which defendants
had to satisfy in order to state a free exercise claim. First, defendants
were required to demonstrate that they sincerely followed a recognizable "religion." 25 Since the parties previously stipulated to the sincerity
of the Amish religious beliefs, this inquiry was not a problem. 26
The second threshold criterion mandated that the actions for
which defendants sought protection be "rooted in religious belief."27
The Court contrasted these activities with those such as Thoreau's,
which were based on personal and philosophical choice, rather than
on religious belief: "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable,
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of
education if it is based on purely secular considerations ...." 2 8 The
Amish way of life, however, was religiously based, and not "merely a
matter of personal preference .... " 29 Indeed, the Court stressed that
the Amish daily life and religious practices were derived from written
scripture, and had been followed for nearly three hundred years by an
organized, coherent religious group. 3 0
Third, the Court inquired into the connection between defendants'
practices and their religious beliefs. It found that the Amish regarded
their entire way of life, including their mode of education via "learning
by doing," as closely related to their beliefs. 31 The Amish protest
against formal education beyond the eighth grade was thus based on
their "central religious concepts" calling for a life apart from worldly
values and influences. 3 2
Having completed this series of threshold inquiries the Court then
followed the two-step analysis advanced in Sherbert, noting that:
[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth
grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of
25. 406 U.S. at 235. The Court has at times struggled with what constitutes a "religion" for
purposes of the free exercise clause. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)
("religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order
to merit First Amendment protection").
26. 406 U.S. at 209. Similarly, this criterion is not controversial in the sacred site cases
where the parties frequently agree that the Indian religious beliefs asserted are sincerely held.
See notes 86-88 infra and accompanying text.
27. 406 U.S. at 215.
28. 406 U.S. at 215. The Court believed that this personal preference exception was necessary to prevent individuals from asserting their own moral standards as ways of circumventing
the law. 406 U.S. at 215-16. Such concerns date back to Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
167 (1878) (an individual could not be allowed to become a "law unto himself").
29. 406 U.S. at 216.
30. 406 U.S. at 216-17, 235. Such an analysis would also seem to favor tribal claims derived
from long-standing, organized religious practices.
31. The Court noted that the Amish lifestyle was "inseparable from and a part of the basic
tenets of their religion ..•." 406 U.S. at 219.
32. 406 U.S. at 210-11. In the sacred site cases, several courts transformed this "centrality"
inquiry into the primary means for determining whether claimants' religious practices had been
burdened by government development. See notes 88-125 infra and accompanying text.
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a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not
deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there
is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the Free Exercise Clause. 33

Applying this analysis, the Court found that since the compulsory education statute exposed Amish children to worldly influences, attitudes, and goals that contravened their beliefs, and since it inhibited
the adolescent's integration into the community, it imposed a severe
burden on defendants' religious practices. 34
In addition, the asserted state interest in the compulsory education
system did not override the burden on defendants' religious practices.
While conceding that providing public schools ranked at the "very
apex" of state functions, 35 the Court held that the two chief goals of
the education system - preparing persons for political participation
and promoting self-reliance - were just as readily satisfied by the
Amish mode of education, so that granting defendants an exemption
would not undermine these goals. 36

II.

EARLIER CASES ADDRESSING INDIAN RELIGIOUS CLAIMS

Free exercise claims asserted by American Indians in other settings
have arisen from such matters as the unlawful taking and transportation of moose, 37 a prisoner wearing his hair in a traditional Indian
style, 38 and the Native American Church's use of peyote in religious
ceremonies. 39 The courts in these earlier cases were among the first to
33. 406 U.S. at 214. Moreover, as in Sherbert, the state had to demonstrate that its interests
could not be served by less restrictive means. 406 U.S. at 235-36.
34. 406 U.S. at 217-18. Describing this burden on defendants' practices, the Court added
that the compulsory school attendance law posed the "very real threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice as they exist today .•.. " 406 U.S. at 218.
35. 406 U.S. at 213.
36. 406 U.S. at 221-23. Significantly, the Court evaluated the value of the Amish education
system from the practitioners' viewpoint:
"It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the eighth grade
may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modem society as
the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation
of the child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish

faith."
406 U.S. at 222. Part IV of this Note argues that a similar perspective is required for proper
consideration of the sacred site claims. See notes 206-31 infra and accompanying text.
37. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
38. Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
39. Some courts have permitted the use of peyote in Indian religious ceremonies. See Native
Am. Church of New York v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), ajfd. mem., 633
F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980); State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964); In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964); Whitehorn v. State,
561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); but see State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142
(1975) (prohibiting use of peyote), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976). See generally Comment,
Brave New World Revisited: Fifteen Years of Chemical Sacraments, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 879
[hereinafter Note, Chemical Sacraments].
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apply the approach developed in Sherbert and Yoder to issues involving Indian religions, and their analysis provides a useful model for
analyzing the sacred site cases. 40 This section focuses on these cases'
treatment of key aspects of the free exercise analysis - the role of
threshold criteria, the proper relationship between the centrality inquiry and the burden requirement, and the balancing of the respective
interests of Indians and government.
A.

Yoder's Threshold Criteria

The application of Yoder's threshold criteria41 to Indian free exercise cases has proven problematic. For example, courts have found
that the requirement that the claimant prove the sincerity of his or her
beliefs creates a difficult tension. While this inquiry serves to strain out
frivolous claims in which parties seek "to wear the mantle of religious
immunity merely as a cloak for illegal activities," 42 a court that probes
too deeply into the parties' sincerity might violate the established principle that the judiciary should not attempt definitions of orthodoxy.43
Courts have negotiated this tension artfully by restricting the evidence they consider regarding sincerity. In People v. Woody, 44 the
leading case addressing the use of peyote in ceremonies of the Native
American Church, the court held that the sincerity inquiry was limited to "whether the defendants' belief in Peyotism is honest and in
good faith." 45 This narrowed scope ensured that: "the court makes a
factual examination of the bona fides of the belief and does not intrude
into the religious issue at all; it does not determine the nature of the
belief but the nature of defendants' adherence to it."46 This good faith
standard was easily satisfied by the Indian defendants in Woody, and
has proven similarly easy to meet for Indians in many other cases.47
40. Several of the sacred site cases referred to these earlier cases, but seem to have misinterpreted their meaning. See notes 175-86 infra and accompanying text.
41. Perhaps the most rigorous statement of the threshold criteria occurred in Frank, where
the court commented that "[t]he free exercise clause may be invoked only where there is a religion involved, only where the conduct in question is religiously based, and only where the claimant is sincere." 604 P.2d at 1071.
42. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 276, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
43. This principle can be traced to the United States Supreme Court decision in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See notes 177-79 infra and accompanying
text.
44. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Reptr. 69 (1964).
45. 61 Cal. 2d at 726, 394 P.2d at 820-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77; see also In re Grady, 61 Cal.
2d 887, 888, 394 P.2d 728, 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (1964).
46. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 726, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77; see also State v.
Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 31, 504 P.2d 950, 954 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974);
Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539, 546 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
47. See, e.g., Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1975) (court based finding of
sincerity largely on defendant's statement that if he cut his long hair he "would feel spiritually
just dead"); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Alaska 1979) (because the trial court found the
defendant to be sincere in his beliefs, "[t]he question of sincerity require[d] no extended discus-
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The Centrality Inquiry and the Burden Requirement

A second issue addressed by courts in these earlier cases concerned
the proper function of the centrality inquiry. The courts used the centrality inquiry as a gauge to measure the degree of connection existing
between the Indians' practices and their religious beliefs,48 and reasoned that those practices which were closely related to beliefs were
most worthy of free exercise protection. This analysis was expressed
by the shorthand formulation that if a practice was "central" to the
Indians' beliefs, then impairments of that practice satisfied Yoder's
burden requirement. 49 The courts recognized, however, that terms
such as "central" were susceptible to shades of meaning, 50 which
should not divert the court from its primary evaluation of the connection between the practice and the belief.
Frank v. State 51 constitutes a noteworthy example of this method
of analysis. The defendant in Frank, an Athabascan Indian, had taken
a moose out of season for use in a religious funeral ceremony, and was
charged with violating Alaskan game laws. 52 The Supreme Court of
Alaska held that Frank's conduct was protected by the free exercise
clause. 53
Performing its burden analysis, the court noted that the religious
practice at issue, a funeral potlatch, was the "most important institution in Athabascan life,"54 and was always performed soon after death.
sion"); Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77 ("we encounter no problem
as to the bona fide nature of defendants' assertion of the free exercise clause"). But cf. United
States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968), discussed in Note, Chemical Sacraments,
supra note 39, at 891-96, where the court found that defendant "had totally failed in her burden
to establish her alleged religious beliefs" in the Neo-American Church. See also Note, Chemical
Sacraments, supra note 39, at 928-31, where the author points out that courts applying a good
faith standard to their sincerity inquiry will have "considerable evidence" available to aid them.
The sincerity inquiry was adequately handled similarly by courts in the sacred site cases. See
notes 86-87 infra and accompanying text.
48. The centrality inquiry played an analogous role in Yoder. See notes 31-32 supra and
accompanying text. In the sacred site cases, the courts carried this inquiry to another level.
They focused on the relationship between the site and practice, rather than the relationship between the practice and beliefs. Such an analysis assumed that the land in question had only 11
derivative value for purposes of the free exercise clause - land was to be protected, if at all, so
that the court might protect practices performed thereon. Cf. notes 88-140 infra and accompanying text, discussing cases where Indian plaintiffs suggested that the site itself might possess an
intrinsic sacredness (that is, a direct connection to beliefs), which alone would warrant free exercise protection.
49. Courts in the sacred site cases, however, did not treat the centrality inquiry merely ns a
threshold issue in a free exercise claim, but instead transformed the inquiry into the controlling
factor in determining whether claimants' practices were burdened. See notes 174-86 infra and
accompanying text.
so. See, e.g.. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 218 (rev. ed. 1975) which states
nine different definitions of "central," one of which is "principal; chief; dominant."
51. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
52. 604 P.2d at 1068-69.
53. 604 P.2d at 1070.
54. 604 P.2d at 1071.
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The Athabascan religion dictated that only native foods could be used
in the potlatch. Moose was at the "apex" 55 of these foods; indeed,
"[m]oose is the centerpiece of the most important ritual in Athabascan
life and is the equivalent of sacred symbols in other religions." 56
Given the importance of moose to a ceremony so closely connected to
defendant's beliefs, the court concluded that the game laws' prohibition constituted a burden on a practice important to Athabascan beliefs, and it thus proceeded to the balancing part of its analysis. 57
The court carefully articulated the scope of its burden inquiry.
The lower court had found that while moose was very desirable, it was
not "specifically required" 58 for the potlatch ceremony; based on this
finding, the lower court held that Frank had not been denied his free
exercise privileges. The Supreme Court of Alaska explicitly rejected
the notion that only practices which were indispensable to the religion
might be afforded protection, noting that "absolute necessity is a standard stricter than that which the law imposes. It is sufficient that the
practice be deeply rooted in religious belief to bring it within the ambit
of the free exercise clause and place on the state its burden of justification. "59 Thus, the court's characterization of moose as the "centerpiece"60 or "cornerstone" of the ritual constituted no more than a
description of the significant connection between this practice and
Athabascan beliefs, and the terms themselves were not dispositive of
the case.61
As in Frank, the defendants in People v. Woody 62 presented strong
evidence regarding the importance of the religious practices in question. The court noted that the "cornerstone of the peyote religion"
was a ceremony referred to as the "meeting." 63 At these ceremonies,
"[t]he central event, of course, consists of the use of peyote in quanti55. 604 P.2d at 1072.
56. 604 P.2d at 1073.
57. 604 P.2d at 1073. See notes 70-73 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the
manner in which the court performed the balancing analysis.
58. 604 P.2d at 1069.
59. 604 P.2d at 1072-73. Similarly, in Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975), the
court held that a prison regulation prohibiting the defendant, a Cree Indian, from wearing long
braided hair violated the free exercise clause. In the course of its Yoder analysis, the court found
that wearing long braided hair was a "tenet of the Indian religion." 522 F.2d at 359. As in
Frank, the court specifically rejected the notion that defendant had to show that wearing long
braided hair was "an absolute tenet of the Indian religion practiced by all Indians." 522 F.2d at
360. See also Note, Chemical Sacraments, supra note 39, at 927-28, (stressing that the Teterud
decision did not require any proof of "centrality" of the practice to the Cree beliefs).
60. 604 P.2d at 1073.
61. 604 P.2d at 1071. This analysis parallels Yoder, where the Supreme Court used terms
such as "central religious concepts" to illustrate the strong connection existing between claimants' religious practices and beliefs. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
62. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
63. 61 Cal. 2d at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
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ties sufficient to produce an hallucinatory state." 64 Not only was the
use of peyote highly important to such ceremonies, but the Native
American Church viewed peyote as itself "an object of worship." 65
The defendants' practices were thus closely connected, if not actually
intertwined, with their religious beliefs. The court concluded that
since the regulation prohibited these practices, it placed a burden on
them for free exercise purposes. 6 6
As in Frank, the Woody court did not mistake labels for sensitive
analysis. In ascertaining whether the threshold criteria were met (and
the balancing test thus triggered), it kept its main focus on the nature
of the relationship between the practice and the belief. "The test of
constitutionality calls for an examination of the degree of abridgment
of religious freedom involved in each case." 67 Terms such as "central"
were merely means of illustrating such relationships and did not themselves constitute the test. 6 8
C. Balancing Indian Religious Interests and Government Interests

A third issue considered by courts in the earlier cases concerned
the method of performing the balancing analysis mandated by Sherbert and Yoder. Unlike courts in the sacred site cases, these courts
64. 61 Cal. 2d at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. Indeed, the court stated that
peyote was so important to defendants' religion that "[t]o forbid the use of peyote is to remove
the theological heart of Peyotism." 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
65. 61 Cal. 2d at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. The notion that the Navajos' use
of peyote warranted protection in part because of its intrinsic sacredness provides an interesting
parallel for the sacred site cases. It might be argued that intrinsic characteristics of the sites
themselves may call for their protection, regardless of the quantity of practices carried on at
those sites. See generally Native Am. Church of New York v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247,
1249-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd. mem., 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980).
66. 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
67. 61 Cal. 2d at 725, 394 P.2d at 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76. That this is the proper reading of
Woody is further evidenced by In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912
(1964), decided by the California Supreme Court on the same day as Woody. In Grady, petitioner, a non-Indian "peyote preacher" and "way shower," pleaded guilty to possession of narcotics. He petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he had used peyote for
religious purposes. The court held that Woody meant that "the state may not prohibit the use of
peyote in connection with bona fide practice of a religious belief." It then concluded that if
defendant's beliefs were held in good faith, he would be entitled to free exercise protection, and
remanded on the sincerity question. 61 Cal. 2d at 888, 394 P.2d at 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 913. As
one commentator has noted, "[n]owhere in the opinion did the court question whether peyote
was 'central' to Grady's practices. If peyote was used 'in connection with' the practice of a
religious belief, then that, apparently, was enough." Note, Chemical Sacraments, supra note 39,
at 889-90. Cf. State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 31, 504 P.2d 950, 954 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974) (in a prosecution under Arizona law for possession of peyote it is a
defense if the parties show that peyote "was being used in connection with a bona fide practice of
a religious belief; that it was an integral part of the religious exercise; and that it was not used in a
manner dangerous to the public health, safety or morals." The court cites Grady for this test,
and does not require any further showing of "centrality.").
68. Courts in the sacred lands context have, however, made a somewhat misleading use of
these earlier cases' burden analysis. See notes 174-86 infra and accompanying test.
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frequently reached the balancing issue, 69 and they established a useful
framework for evaluating government interests asserted in support of
regulations. 70
First, the courts recognized that under Sherbert and Yoder only a
"compelling state interest" could override an individual's free exercise
rights. 71 This high standard meant that many important state interests might nevertheless have to yield to Indian religious claims. For
example, in Frank, the court noted that in Alaska there was a "very
strong interest underlying hunting restrictions. " 72 Yet, the identification of a strong interest in game regulations, and particularly in maintaining the moose population, was not alone dispositive. The case
instead turned on the question "whether that [state] interest, or any
other, will suffer if an exemption is granted to accommodate the religious practice at issue."73
Similarly, in Woody, the court commented that California had a
very strong interest in enforcing its narcotic laws, and in ensuring that
fraudulent claims of religious protection did not undermine those
laws. 74 Yet these important state interests also had to yield to the
Indian defendants' sincerely held religious claims. 75 This singling out
of Indians for special protection creates a striking counterpoint to the
69. See, e.g., Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1975); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d
1068, 1073 (Alaska 1979); Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
70. Much of their treatment of the religious interests involved was discussed previously. See
notes 37-68 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, some courts perceived Indian religious
interests as part of larger social issues regarding tolerance. In Woody, the court concluded:
We know that some will urge that it is more important to subserve the rigorous enforcement
of the narcotics laws than to carve out of them an exception for a few believers in a strange
faith ..•. [Yet] [t]he varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our
national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition
when we protect the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in using
peyote one night at a meeting in a desert hogan near Needles, California.
61 Cal. 2d at 727-28, 394 P.2d at 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
71. See, e.g., Frank, 604 P.2d at 1070; State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 29, 504 P.2d
950, 952 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40
Cal. Rptr. at 74; Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539, 554 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). Indeed, one
explanation for the failure of the Oregon Court of Appeals to follow the Woody exception for
peyote use seems to be the court's misunderstanding of the "compelling interest" requirement.
See State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 797-98, 537 P.2d 142, 143-44 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
955 (1976). See also Note, Chemical Sacraments, supra note 39, at 905 n.130.
72. 604 P.2d at 1073.
73. 604 P.2d at 1073 (footnote omitted).
74. 61 Cal. 2d at 723, 394 P.2d at 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
75. Significantly, the use of peyote by the Native American Church is the only major exception to the drug laws that state courts and legislatures have recognized. New Mexico, Montana,
and Iowa have recognized the exception by statute, while California, Arizona, and Oklahoma
have recognized the exception by judicial decision. See Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. at 29, 504
P.2d at 952 n.1; Note, Chemical Sacraments, supra note 39, at 900-01 nn.111-12. A similar
exception to the Federal Controlled Substance Act has been provided by regulation, see 21
C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1986) ("[t]he listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not
apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American
Church").
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sacred site cases, where most of the courts denied Indian religious
claims without even considering the merit of the state interests
involved. 76
Second, in contrast to courts in the sacred site cases, the earlier
courts followed closely Yoder's admonition that the availability of less
restrictive alternatives be considered in the balancing analysis. In
Teterud v. Burns, 71 the government argued that a series of interests in
penal administration justified a regulation limiting prisoners' hair
length. The court rejected that claim, noting that less restrictive alternatives existed. For example, the government's interests in sanitary
food preparation and the careful and safe operation of machinery
could be served by having prisoners with long hair wear hair nets; its
interest in ready identification of prisoners could be served by rephotographing those with long hair; and its interest in preventing the hiding
of contraband in long hair could adequately be served through normal
searches of the prisoners. 78
Third, the courts mandated that the asserted state interests be articulated specifically - vague fears or concerns were insufficient to
override defendants' free exercise claims. In Frank v. State, for example, the state argued that allowing Athabascans to take moose out of
season would trigger "widespread civil disobedience"79 culminating in
a pattern of "poaching and creek robbing," 80 which necessitated that
no exception be granted defendants. The court rejected this argument
completely, holding that "[i]nterests which justify limitations on religious practices must be far more definite than these." 81 In short,
courts in the earlier cases uniformly placed far greater emphasis on
having the state articulate its interests concretely, with attention to
less restrictive alternatives, than do their counterparts in the sacred
site cases. 82

III.

THE SACRED SITE CASES

A. Free Exercise and Indian Sacred Sites
This section of the Note considers judicial application of the Yoder
analysis to cases in which American Indian plaintiffs have sought free
exercise clause protection for part or all of a site associated with their
76. See notes 88-140 infra and accompanying text.
77. 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
78. 522 F.2d at 361.
79. 604 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Alaska 1979).
80. 604 P.2d at 1074.
81. 604 P.2d at 1074. The court added that "U]ustifications founded only on fear and apprehension are insufficient to overcome rights asserted under the First Amendment." 604 P.2d at
1074 (quoting Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 361-62 (8th Cir. 1975)); see also Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
82. See notes 88-154 infra and accompanying text.
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religious practices and beliefs. 83 The courts have generally denied
plaintiffs relief. This Note argues that in doing so, they have applied
the Yoder analysis to the context of Indian religions in an inappropriate manner. Specifically, the courts have overstated the role of the
threshold centrality inquiry, thus often unfairly denying to Indian
plaintiffs the protection afforded by the Sherbert/Yoder balancing
test. 84 Moreover, the few courts that have reached the balancing portion of the analysis often have not accorded proper regard to the Indians' religious interests. 8s
1. Yoder's Threshold Criteria
In all of the cases where they sought free exercise protection of
sacred sites, American Indian plaintiffs readily demonstrated that they
followed an actual religion in which they sincerely believed.8 6 Similarly, plaintiffs were often able to show that practices performed at the
sites were based upon their religious beliefs, as opposed to mere cultural or historical concerns. 87 However, in these cases the courts erroneously transformed Yoder's threshold inquiry regarding the
importance or centrality of the claimant's practices to his religious beliefs into the determinative aspect of the burden analysis.
2. Burdens on Sites and Practices

a. Centrality. One of the most influential cases involving the relationship between American Indian sacred sites and the free exercise
clause is Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 88 In Sequoyah, three
individual Cherokee Indians and two bands of the Cherokee Nation
brought a class action in which they sought to enjoin the completion
83. See note 6 supra.
84. See notes 90-128, 174-86 infra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 144-57, 187-95 infra and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 586
(9th Cir. 1985) ("[t]he government does not challenge the sincerity of the Indians' beliefs nor
their religious character"}, cert granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 740 (D.C. Cir.) (parties "stipulated
that the plaintiffs' beliefs are religious and are sincerely held"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983);
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir.) ("[t]he Cherokees have a
religion within the meaning of the Constitution and the sincerity of the adherence of individual
plaintiffs to that religion is not questioned"}, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Crow v. Gullet,
541 F. Supp. 785, 790 (D.S.D. 1982) ("there is no dispute that plaintiffs' practices at Bear Butte
are based upon a system of belief that is religious and is sincerely held"}, ajfd., 706 F.2d 856 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
87. See Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740; Northwest Indian Cemetery, 565 F. Supp. 586, 594 (N.D.
Cal. 1983), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987). In contrast, in Sequoyah. 620 F.2d at
1163, and lnupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188-89 (D.
Alaska 1982), ajfd., 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 68 (1985), both courts
suggested that some of the Indian plaintiffs advanced cultural and not religious concerns.
88. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), ajfg., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
953 (1980).
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and flooding of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River. 89
Plaintiffs argued that land along the Little Tennessee River that would
be flooded by the Tellico Reservoir was sacred to their religion. 90 The
land was the location of the ancient village of Chota, which had served
as a capital, sanctuary, and as the religious "birthplace of the
Cherokee. " 91
Not only did the land possess intrinsically sacred qualities, but it
also constituted plaintiffs' "connection with the Great Spirit. " 92 In
addition, the Cherokees felt that the beliefs and knowledge of their
ancestors had been placed into the land where they were buried and
that current medicine men obtained their powers by communing with
these ancestors. 93 Thus, plaintiffs argued that the TVA's proposed
flooding of the land violated their right to free exercise by destroying
the sacred and holy character of the area, and denying them the access
necessary for pilgrimages and collection of medicines. 94
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of an injunction. In applying the Yoder analysis to the
sacred site context, the Sixth Circuit majority treated the centrality
inquiry as the exclusive means of gauging whether Yoder's burden requirement had been satisfied. Finding that plaintiffs' affidavits failed
to establish the "centrality or indispensability of the Little Tennessee
Valley to Cherokee religious observances," 95 the majority ruled that
89. 620 F.2d at 1160. For discussion and description of the case, see generally Note, Native
Americans' Access to Religious Sites: Underprotected Under the Free Exercise Clause?, 26 B.C. L.
REV. 463, 475-81 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Native Americans' Access to Religious Sites]; Note,
Native American Free Exercise Rights to the Use of Public Lands, 63 B.U. L. REV. 141, 143-45,
161-63 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights]; Note, Indian Worship 1•.
Government Development: A New Breed of Religion Cases, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 313, 323-24
[hereinafter Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development]; Note, Indian Religious Freedom
and Government Development ofPublic Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1461 n.65 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Indian Religious Freedom].
90. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160. Plaintiffs sought protection for the sacred character of the
region itself, in addition to protecting practices they performed there. As one commentator
noted, "[t]he Cherokee practice their religion, in part, by worshipping the valley itself; they believe that prayer to and at sacred sites facilitates direct communication with the supernatural
world." Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 161 (footnote omitted).
91. 620 F.2d at 1162. One affiant described Chota as "analogous to a Cherokee Jerusalem."
Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 161 n.112.
92. 620 F.2d at 1162. The Cherokee made pilgrimages to the site, during which they recounted the legends and events associated with the site so as to preserve and maintain the content
of their religion. One anthropologist commented that "[v]isiting Chota is analogous to reading a
Christian bible"; thus, attempting to understand the Cherokee religion in the absence of access to
sacred sites "would be like attempting to understand or practice Judaism or Christianity without
the Book of Genesis." Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 162 n.115.
93. 620 F.2d at 1162. Indeed, the court at least partly recognized the special role of the site
in Cherokee practices and beliefs, noting that "because of their beliefs respecting the transmission
of knowledge and spiritual powers to succeeding generations, particular geographic locations
figure more prominently in Indian religion and culture than in those of most other people." 620
F.2d at 1163.
94. 620 F.2d at 1160.
95. 620 F.2d at 1164. The term "central" is susceptible of different shades of meaning. By
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the plaintiffs had "fallen short of demonstrating that worship at the
particular geographic location in question is inseparable from the way
of life (Yoder), the cornerstone of their religious observance (Frank),
or plays the central role in their religious ceremonies and practices
(Woody)." 96 Applying this standard, the majority concluded that
since the land was not central to the Cherokee practices, the TVA's
flooding of the land did not amount to a constitutional burden on
plaintiffs' practices and beliefs.97 Because it found no burden on plaintiffs' practices, the majority did not reach the balancing part of the
Yoder test.9 8
The majority also questioned whether plaintiffs' activities at the
site were based on religious, as opposed to other, concerns. It suggested that plaintiffs sought to protect Chota primarily for historical
and cultural reasons, which constituted a mere "personal preference"99 lying outside the parameters of the free exercise clause. 100
Under Yoder, the court's finding that the practices associated with the
site were not "rooted in religious belief" 101 would alone be sufficient to
dispose of the case, and the court's application of the centrality standard could thus be viewed as an alternative holding. 102
modifying "central" with the term "indispensable" the court thus made its standard stricter,
indicating that only unique sites might even have a chance at some manner of free exercise
protection. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
96. 620 F.2d at 1164 (citations omitted).
97. 620 F.2d at 1165. Part II of this Note argues thatFrank v. State and People v. Woody do
not support such a strict centrality standard. See notes 51-68 supra and accompanying text. It
seems that "[t]he centrality requirement singlehandedly defeated the Cherokee claims." Note,
Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 328. The dissent argued that since
the court had not yet enunciated its centrality standard at the time the complaint and affidavits
were filed, the case should have been remanded to allow plaintiffs to offer further evidence concerning the connection between the site and their religious practices and beliefs. 620 F.2d at
1165 (Merritt, J., dissenting). Cf Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at
165 (contending that the anthropological evidence the Sequoyah plaintiffs had already introduced
should have satisfied the court's centrality standard).
98. 620 F.2d at 1165.
99. 620 F.2d at 1164. This term was initially used by the United States Supreme Court in
Yoder to describe personal and philosophical beliefs such as those of Thoreau, which were not
protected by the free exercise clause. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). See notes
27-28 supra and accompanying text.
100. 620 F.2d at 1164-65.
101. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text. See also Note,
Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 144 n.23.
102. Several other factors seem to have driven the Sequoyah court's denial of the Cherokee
claims. Since 1966 the federal government had spent $111,000,000 on the Tellico Dam project.
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 610, ajfd., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). Moreover, in 1979 Congress had directed that the project be completed notwithstanding the provisions of "any other law." 620 F.2d at 1161. Despite its centrality rhetoric, then, the court may well have engaged in an implicit form of balancing in which it
determined that the "congressional command" that the project be completed established a compelling governmental interest. 620 F.2d at 1161.
In addition, the court emphasized plaintiffs' delay in bringing their claims. Although plaintiffs knew about the project since 1965, this suit had not been filed until "the eve of its [the
project's] completion." 480 F. Supp. at 610. See also 620 F.2d at 1162. Although the court did
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Several courts have applied the centrality standard articulated in
Sequoyah. 103 For example, in Wilson v. Block, 104 the Hopi Indian
Tribe, the Navajo Medicinemen's Association, and individual Navajos
challenged the federal government's decision permitting private interests to expand the government-owned Snow Bowl ski facilities located
on the San Francisco Peaks. 105 Plaintiffs sought the phased removal of
all artificial structures on the Peaks, or, at a minimum, an injunction
barring further development of the area.1°6
Plaintiffs presented free exercise claims similar to those advanced
in Sequoyah. The Navajos argued that the Peaks possessed intrinsically sacred characteristics. They believed that specific Navajo gods
resided on the Peaks. 107 Indeed, they considered the mountains themselves as composing the body of a living god, "with various peaks
forming the head, shoulders, and knees of a body reclining and facing
to the east, while the trees, plants, rocks, and earth form the skin." 108
In addition, the Navajos performed religious ceremonies and gathered
ceremonial objects and herbs on the Peaks. 109
Similarly, the Hopis believed that the Peaks were sacred because
emissaries of the Creator, termed "Kachinas," resided on them for six
months each year. These emissaries provided rainfall and helped susnot base its holding on any doctrine of repose, such as !aches, plaintiffs' delay may well have
made it easier for the court to deny them relief. Part IV of this Note discusses the need for
American Indian claimants to bring suits seeking to protect sacred sites as quickly as possible.
See notes 230-31 infra and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 743-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal.
1983), modified, 764 F.2d 581, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987); Inupiat Community of the Arctic
Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), ajfd., 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 68 (1985). In Inupiat, Eskimo plaintiffs sought to quiet title to the area
lying from three to sixty-five miles offshore in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas of the Arctic
Ocean. 548 F. Supp. at 184-85. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that federal government
leasing in the region interfered with practice of their religion on the superjacent sea ice. The
court rejected their free exercise claims, holding that since plaintiffs failed to show the significance of the region to their religion, they had not satisfied Yoder's burden requirement. 548 F.
Supp. at 188-89. The court supported this decision by relying on the Sequoyah centrality standard. 548 F. Supp. at 189 n.4. See also Note, Native Americans' Access to Religious Sites, supra
note 89, at 476-77 (suggesting that the court may also have regarded plaintiffs' claims as "too
generalized" to be based on religious, as opposed to other, interests).
104. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
105. 708 F.2d at 738. For discussion and description of the case, see generally Note, Natfre
Americans' Access to Religious Sites, supra note 89, at 485-91; Note, Indian Religious Freedom,
supra note 89, at 1455, nn.33-34, 1460 n.59; Note, Indian Worship v. Government Developmcllt,
supra note 89, at 322, nn.66 & 68, 330-31.
106. 708 F.2d at 740.
107. 708 F.2d at 738. For further discussion of Navajo beliefs and their relationship to sites,
see notes 141-54 infra and accompanying text.
108. 708 F.2d at 738.
109. 708 F.2d at 738, 740.
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tain the villages. 110 The Hopis had built many shrines on the Peaks
and, like the Navajos, they performed ceremonies and collected sacred
objects and herbs there. 111 Plaintiffs argued that the proposed expansion of the 777 acre Snow Bowl ski area violated their free exercise
rights by diminishing the intrinsic sacredness of the area, insulting
their deities, and interfering with their ability to pray and conduct ceremonies on the Peaks.112
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. Relying on the Sequoyah analysis, the court articulated the centrality standard in an even more extreme form than in the earlier case:
"We thus hold that plaintiffs seeking to restrict government land use
in the name of religious freedom must, at a minimum, demonstrate
that the government's proposed land use would impair a religious
practice that could not be performed at any other site." 113 The court
stressed that this version of the centrality standard was only a minimum, and that satisfying it did not necessarily demonstrate a burden
on free exercise.114
Applying this standard, the court held that plaintiffs had failed to
show that the small region of the Peaks encompassed by the Snow
Bowl was central or indispensable to their religious practices. It noted
that plaintiffs would still have free access to the remainder of the
Peaks for collecting herbs and objects, and performing ceremonies. 115
As in Sequoyah, the court concluded that since the Snow Bowl was not
central to plaintiffs' practices, impairment of that site did not constitute a burden for free exercise purposes. Since it found no burden on
110. 708 F.2d at 738. Thus, as in Sequoyah, plaintiffs argued that the site itself had sacred
qualities, apart from the activities conducted there.
111. 708 F.2d at 738.
112. 708 F.2d at 740.
113. 708 F.2d at 744 (footnote omitted).
114. 708 F.2d at 744 n.5. The court's indication that satisfying its strict centrality standard
still might not warrant a finding of a burden on free exercise suggests that free exercise protection
would be available to few, if any, sites held sacred by American Indians or other groups.
The notion that a site is not deserving of protection if the religious practices can be performed
at other places is similar to the position that elements of "mainstream" religious practices are not
entitled to protection if substitutes for them exist. The Wilson court's reasoning thus implies that
the government could regulate or prohibit Christian practitioners' use of wine, wafer, and other
sacraments in their ceremonies without burdening those practices, since substitute products
could be used. Because no burden would be said to exist, the government would not even have to
assert any interests to justify the regulation or prohibition.
115. 708 F.2d at 744. In narrowing its focus solely to the importance of the connection
between the Snow Bowl area and plaintiffs' religious practices and beliefs, the court rejected
plaintiffs' assertion that "the mountain as a whole, and not just parts thereof, is considered sacred." 708 F.2d at 744. This analysis seems to conflict with the court's earlier attempt to describe carefully the nature of plaintiffs' practices and beliefs. See notes 105-11 supra and
accompanying text. Indeed, the court seemed to be indicating that although the Navajos regarded the entire region as the body of a living god, the government could cut off part of that
body without in any way interfering with the Navajo religion.
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plaintiffs' religious beliefs or practices the court did not reach the balancing part of the Yoder test and the question whether "ski area expansion is a compelling governmental interest."116
Moreover, the court rejected plaintiffs' challenges to its use of the
centrality standard. Plaintiffs contended that the centrality standard
was an overly restrictive way of measuring whether a burden existed
on their religious practices and beliefs. They asserted that Sherbert v.
Verner 117 and Thomas v. Review Board, 118 and not Sequoyah, established the proper standard for determining whether there was an indirect burden on religious practices and beliefs. 119 Noting that the
proposed expansion of the ski facilities "effectively prohibits the practice of their religions," plaintiffs contended that the burden thus created was "greater than that of the practitioners in Sherbert and
Thomas, who ... could have continued to practice their beliefs simply
by choosing to forego government benefits." 120 The court, however,
declined to extend Sherbert and Thomas beyond their specific factual
situations, and dismissed the argument. 121
Plaintiffs further contended that the centrality standard, as stated
in Sequoyah and adopted by the court, violated the principle that
courts are not to inquire into the orthodoxy of a claimant's religious
beliefs or practices. 122 The court countered that the Sequoyah standard did not mandate judicial consideration of religious doctrines but
116. 708 F.2d at 745. In another portion of the opinion the court also held that expansion of
the ski facilities did not burden plaintiffs' freedom to hold certain beliefs. It rejected plaintiffs'
argument that the desecration of the site would force them to modify their religious doctrine,
thereby creating a burden on free exercise. 708 F.2d at 740-42.
117. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text.
118. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that the board had impermissibly burdened Thomas' free
exercise rights by compelling him to choose between the exercise of his rights and an otherwise
available public benefit).
119. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 743. In Sherbert and Thomas the Supreme Court held that the
distinction between direct and indirect burdens on religious practices was irrelevant for purposes
of free exercise analysis. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
120. 708 F.2d at 743.
121. 708 F.2d at 743. In refusing to extend Sherbert and Thomas beyond the situation where
the government attempted to condition benefits on a claimant's decision to follow or forego a
religious practice or belief, the court commented that "[t]hose cases did not purport to create a
benchmark against which to test all indirect burden claims." 708 F.2d at 743. This reasoning is
misleading since many mainstream free exercise cases as well as Indian religion cases treat Sherbert and Thomas, along with Yoder, as leading authorities. One commentator has suggested that
courts like Wilson have hesitated to extend free exercise protection beyond the two traditional
categories - where plaintiffs "claimed that compliance with a law requires them to violate a
tenet of their religion, or claimants have alleged that they will be denied government benefits
unless they modify their religious practice." Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development,
supra at note 89, at 313 (footnote omitted). See also Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note
89, at 1460 n.59 (traditional categories of analysis are "inapplicable to Indian belief, since no
benefit in the commonly understood sense of the terms flows from government's leaving sacred
sites on public lands undisturbed").
122. 708 F.2d at 743. The principle against judicial determinations of orthodoxy is considered more fully at notes 177-79 infra.
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rather focused "solely upon the importance of the geographic site in
question to the practice of the plaintiffs' religion." 123 The court reasoned that if the site were central to the practice, it might warrant
protection even if the practice itself was not central to plaintiffs' beliefs.124 It thus denied this challenge to the centrality standard. 125
b. Coercive effects. In Crow v. Gullet, 126 the court articulated an
alternative means of determining whether a burden on claimants'
practices and beliefs existed. In Crow, traditional chiefs and spiritual
leaders of the Tsistsistas Nation and the Lakota Nation challenged the
state's construction of roads, bridges, parking lots and similar access
facilities at Bear Butte. 127 Plaintiffs sought an injunction halting the
construction and ordering the removal of artificial structures near the
site. 128
Plaintiffs introduced numerous affidavits and several witnesses to
establish the site's religious significance. The Lakota asserted that
Bear Butte was intrinsically sacred, as it was the place where the tribe
"originally met with the Great Spirit." 129 In addition, the region was
"the most significant site of Lakota religious ceremonies," 130 and the
deeply religious "Vision Quest" 131 was performed there. Similarly, the
Tsistsistas made pilgrimages to and performed religious ceremonies at
123. 708 F.2d at 743.
124. 708 F.2d at 743. This argument is also misleading. Regardless of the scrutiny made of
claimants' practices, an inquiry into the importance of a site to those practices may still lead to
judicial evaluations of the claimants' orthodoxies.
125. 708 F.2d at 743. The court also rejected claims based on the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act, as originally enacted, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)). 708 F.2d at 747. See notes 197-201 infra and accompanying text.
126. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), ajfd., 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 977 (1983). The reasoning and analysis of the case is contained in the district court
opinion; the eighth circuit only entered a brief, per curiam opinion.
127. 541 F. Supp. at 787-88. Plaintiffs challenged the state's restriction of their access to the
Butte during the construction period. 541 F. Supp. at 788, 792. This allegation is considered
more fully at note 142 infra. Plaintiffs also contended that tourists visiting the Butte violated the
sanctity of their pilgrimages and ceremonies. They argued that the state impinged on their free
exercise rights by permitting intrusions by the tourists. The court, however, rejected this claim
based on an establishment clause analysis. 541 F. Supp. at 788, 791-92.
128. 541 F. Supp. at 788. Plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief and damages based on 42
U.S.C. § 1983. For discussion and description of the case, see generally Note, Native Americans'
Access to Religious Sites, supra note 89, at 483-85, 490-91; Note, Indian Worship v. Government
Development, supra note 89, at 325-26.
129. 541 F. Supp. at 788. This assertion that the site was intrinsically sacred and holy in
character was analogous to claims made in Sequoyah and Wilson. See notes 90-91 and 107-08
supra and accompanying text.
130. 541 F. Supp. at 788.
131. 541 F. Supp. at 788. The Vision Quest was "one of the seven sacred ceremonies of the
Lakota people." During the ceremony, the practitioner fasted, climbed to a solitary point on the
Butte, sang aloud, and prayed to the Great Spirit. 541 F. Supp. at 788. See also Note, Indian
Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1456 n.41 (during the Vision Quest the worshipper received
"an all-important vision from a personal guardian spirit. This vision will guide the recipient
throughout his or her life, and is often an essential part of the transition from youth to
adulthood").
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the site. 132 Plaintiffs contended that the construction violated their
free exercise rights by desecrating the sacred area at the foot of the
Butte, and diminishing the "power of the Butte as a ceremonial
ground." 133
The district court denied the claims, holding that plaintiffs had
failed to establish that the construction placed an improper burden on
their free exercise rights. 134 In performing its burden analysis, however, the court did not use a centrality standard. Rather, it held that
to demonstrate a burden on their practices plaintiffs had to "show the
coercive effect of the [restriction] as it operates against the practice of
their religion." 135 In prior cases this coercive effect standard had been
satisfied in two types of situations: where, as in Yoder, the government
regulation forced practitioners to violate the tenets of their religion,
and where, as in Sherbert and Thomas, the government conditioned
receipt of public benefits on claimants' foregoing their religious practices.136 The court noted that the Indian plaintiffs might meet the coercive effect standard by showing that their situation was analogous to
those in Yoder or Sherbert,· alternatively, plaintiffs could satisfy the
standard by demonstrating that "their conduct in the course of exercising their beliefs has been unduly restricted."1 37
132. 541 F. Supp. at 788.
133. 541 F. Supp. at 788, 791.
134. 541 F. Supp. at 791. The court likewise denied the remainder of plaintiffs' claims on
various grounds, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 541 F. Supp. at 794.
135. 541 F. Supp. at 790 (quoting School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223
(1963)).
136. 541 F. Supp. at 790. See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716-18 (1981)
("[W]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a
religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief,
thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs, a burden upon religion exists."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 {1972) (holding compulsory state education impermissibly burdened the Amish method of preparing for the
Amish lifestyle which is integral to their religious beliefs and practices); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that liberties of religion •.• may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege"); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (holding that the state could not exclude members of a religious
faith, "because of their faith or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation") (emphasis in original). One commentator has noted that these situations demark the "two
contexts in which religion cases traditionally have arisen." Note, Indian Worship v. Government
Development, supra note 89, at 325.
137. 541 F. Supp. at 790-91. Although the limited evidence presented in Crow may have
constricted the court's application of the coercive effect standard, it should be noted that this
standard is potentially more flexible than is the centrality approach used by courts in Sequoyah
and Wilson. Indeed, the coercive effect standard might well be applied so that it focused on
whether plaintiffs' performance of their ceremonies at a given site had been interfered with in
some obvious manner. This contrasts with the centrality standard, which confronts plaintiffs
with the difficult task of showing that the site was unique to their religious practices. See notes
173-86 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Note, Native Americans' Access to Religious Sites, supra
note 89, at 490-91 (arguing that "in looking for a burden before applying the balancing test, the
[Crow] court gave a broad reading to 'burden' " and concluding that "[g]iven the facts of the
case, the finding of the Crow court was reasonable"). But cf. Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 330-31 (arguing that in applying the coercive effect stan-
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The court held, however, that the construction did not have a coercive effect on plaintiffs' religious practices. It stressed that plaintiffs
had not sufficiently elaborated how particular Lakota and Tsistsistas
ceremonies carried out on the Butte were impaired by building of
roads and bridges at the foot of the Butte. 138 Indeed, there was some
indication that many Indians themselves did not think that the construction burdened their practices - the state park manager testified
that "numerous Indian religious campers requested that the State provide safer and better access to the ceremonial grounds." 139 Courts
other than Crow have also employed a coercive effects analysis. However, the standard has not yet gained unequivocal acceptance. 140
3. Balancing Indian Religious Interests Against Government
Development Interests

Badoni v. Higginson 141 was one of the few cases in which a court
ruling on sacred site issues reached the balancing part of the Yoder
analysis. 142 In Badoni, individual Navajos, several Navajo medicine
dard, courts such as the one in Crow focused too greatly on the intent as opposed to the result of
the government regulations).
138. 541 F. Supp. at 791. By focusing on the impairment of specific ceremonies, the court
implicitly rejected any argument that the Butte as a whole was sacred and that an infringement
of any portion of the site constituted a burden on free exercise.
139. 541 F. Supp. at 791. Moreover, the court seemed to be strongly influenced by the state's
earlier attempts to accommodate the Indians' religious practices. For example, religious campers
had been granted a special area apart from that used by the general public. Religious campers
could acquire permits to stay on the Butte longer than other campers, and they did not have to
follow any established platforms or trails at the site. 541 F. Supp. at 794.
140. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), ajfd., 638 F.2d 172
(10th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). As in Crow, the appellate court in Badoni
articulated a coercive effect standard based on language in School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963). Since the Tenth Circuit reached the balancing part of its analysis without
deciding whether government action had infringed on plaintiffs' free exercise rights, it did not
have occasion to apply further its coercive effect standard. 638 F.2d at 177 n.4. See also notes
141-55 infra and accompanying text.
Similarly, the lower court in Wilson relied in part on a coercive effect analysis in finding that
there was no burden on plaintiffs' religious practices. The appellate court's affirmance, however,
was based on a centrality analysis and did not address the alternative standard. See Hopi Indian
Tribe v. Block, 8 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3073 (D.D.C. 1981), ajfd.
sub nom. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1983). See also
Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 326.
141. 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), ajfd., 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981).
142. See also Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586
(N.D. Cal. 1983), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987), discussed at notes 155-72 infra
and accompanying text; Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), ajfd., 706 F.2d 856 (8th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). One of plaintiffs' claims in Crow was that
the state had burdened their religious practices by closing the Butte area for overnight camping
during the period of construction of the access road and parking lot. In rejecting this claim the
district court relied on a type of balancing analysis. It held that the state had a "compelling
interest" in finishing the projects, based on administrative and environmental concerns. In addition, the court noted that closing the site temporarily during construction was a "least restrictive
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men, and three chapters of the Navajo Nation sought an injunction in
connection with the federal government's operation of the Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir, and its management of the Rainbow Bridge
National Monument.143
The Rainbow Bridge, a large sandstone arch, was located within
the 160 acre Rainbow Bridge National Monument. 144 Plaintiffs regarded the Rainbow Bridge, a nearby prayer spot, spring, and cave as
sacred areas, holding "positions of central importance" in their religion.145 They considered these geological formations as the "incarnate
forms of Navajo gods," who provided them with rainfall and protection.146 Moreover, before the area was flooded, plaintiffs performed
religious ceremonies near the Bridge, and used water from the spring
for conducting other ceremonies. 147
The federal government had created a reservoir behind the Glen
Canyon Dam and had subsequently filled it to a high level. The reservoir had, in turn, flooded the sacred canyon located near the Rainbow
Bridge. 148 Plaintiffs alleged that in flooding this canyon and in creatmeans" of completing the project quickly and with minimal danger to public safety and the
environment. 541 F. Supp. at 792.
Yet, prior to considering the strength of the state's interest, the court had already suggested
that the overnight closing of the site did not place any burden on plaintiffs' religious practices
because no person had ever been denied access for religious purposes. 541 F. Supp. at 792. The
court's subsequent balancing thus did not seem to follow the comparative pattern envisioned by
Yoder. See also Badoni, discussed at note 140 supra.
143. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 175-76. In addition to their free exercise claim, plaintiffs sought
relief under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-35 (1982), alleging that the government had continued operating the dam and reservoir without providing the
required environmental impact statement. For further discussion and description of the case see
generally, Note, Native Americans' Access to Religious Sites, supra note 89, at 481-83; Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 145-46, 159-60; Note, Indian Worship v.
Government Development, supra note 89, at 331-32; Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note
89, at 1455-56.
144. 638 F.2d at 175. Although it was surrounded by the Navajo reservation, the monument
was public land administered by the National Park Service.
145. 638 F.2d at 177.
146. 638 F.2d at 177. The Navajo's belief that living gods inhabited such natural objects may
have stemmed from "the fact that several of the canyon's rock formations resemble human beings with Native American facial characteristics." Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights,
supra note 89, at 160 n.105. In addition, the Navajo believed that the Rainbow Bridge itself was
inhabited by two gods, one male, one female, who had transformed themselves into stone after
aiding two Navajo children in moving from the land of the gods across the canyon to the land of
humans. Navajos called the mountain near the Rainbow Bridge "Head of Earth," and regarded
it as the earth god's crown. Similarly, gods known as Water People lived in rivers, springs, rainbows and serpents, and collaborated to provide the Navajos with rainfall. Id. at 160 n.105-09,
which also discusses K. LUCKERT, NAVAJO MOUNTAIN AND RAINBOW BRIDGE RELIGION
(1977).
147. 638 F.2d at 177. In one such ceremony, the Navajos requested rain by "taking water
from a sacred spring located in the canyon floor and ceremoniously depositing it in another
spring located on the top of Head of Earth .... " Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights,
supra note 89, at 160 n.108.
148. 638 F.2d at 175-77. The court noted that "(b]ecause of the operation of the Dam and
Lake Powell [the reservoir], the springs and prayer spot are under water." 638 F.2d at 177.
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ing a tourist attraction, the government had drowned some of their
gods, destroyed the sacred character of the site, and denied them access to the prayer spots necessary to their ceremonies, thereby violating the free exercise clause. 149
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. Without addressing the question whether the government's actions infringed on plaintiffs' free exercise of religion, the court nevertheless
held that "the government's interest in maintaining the capacity of
Lake Powell at a level that intrudes into the Monument outweighs
plaintiffs' religious interest." 150 The court noted that the dam and reservoir were key elements in a water storage and power generation project that covered several states. In order to alleviate the alleged
infringements on plaintiffs' practices, the reservoir's surface level
would have to be dropped so far that its storage capacity would be cut
in half. 151
Such a reduction would greatly lessen the water available to several states for irrigation, development of natural resources, and municipal and industrial uses. 152 Moreover, the court concluded that since
the reservoir had to be maintained at the current level and no other
action besides reducing the level could eliminate the alleged infringements on plaintiffs' religious practices, there was no less restrictive
manner in which the government could attain its interests. 153 The
149. 638 F.2d at 176-77. One of the drowned gods was Talking Rock, a collection of eight
Rock People who lived on the floor of the Canyon. These Rock People heard every word spoken
in their vicinity and in turn informed the Navajos when ceremonies ought to be performed.
Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 145 n.30 and 160 n.106.
Plaintiffs also contended that the government had violated their free exercise rights by permitting tourists to visit the Rainbow Bridge, because tourists had desecrated the sacred character
of the area, and interfered with plaintiffs' performance of their ceremonies. 683 F.2d at 176-77.
The court held, however, that the establishment clause precluded the government from excluding
tourists from the site. It argued that "[w]ere it otherwise, the Monument would become a government-managed religious shrine." 638 F.2d at 179. This establishment clause issue is also
discussed in Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 331-32.
150. 638 F.2d at 177 & n.4. The court explicitly rested its decision on the balancing analysis,
rejecting the lower court's finding that plaintiffs' lack of a property interest in the Monument
barred relief. It stressed that the "government must manage its property in a manner that does
not offend the Constitution." 638 F.2d at 176. See also Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480
F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), ajfd., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.) (plaintiffs' lack of property
interest in the site is not determinative of the free exercise analysis), cert denied, 452 U.S. 953
(1980).
151. 638 F.2d at 177. For background concerning the Glen Dam and Reservoir project, see
Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1171
(1974).
152. 638 F.2d at 177. See also Note, Native Americans' Access to Religious Sites, supra note
89, at 483 ("The Badoni court protected government interests it perceived as compelling because
of the impact of the project on large numbers of Americans").
153. 638 F.2d at 177. The court's analysis illustrates problems with performing a less restrictive means inquiry after the challenged project has been substantially completed. See notes 19395 infra and accompanying text.
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court's evaluation of the government interest thus seemed to follow
the pattern established in Yoder. 154
B. Recent Developments: Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association v. Peterson
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson 155
was the first case in which American Indian plaintiffs succeeded in
obtaining free exercise protection for a sacred site. In Northwest,
members of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa tribes, several associations, and the state of California challenged the United States Forest
Service's decision to build a section of the "G-0" road through the
Blue Creek Unit of Six Rivers National Forest, and to adopt a plan
permitting timber harvesting in that Unit.156
Plaintiffs contended that the entire northeastern corner of the Blue
Creek Unit constituted a sacred region known as "high country."157
Since the early nineteenth century, members of the Yurok, Karok, and
Tolowa tribes had performed religious ceremonies in the high country,
and they continued to do so. 158 For example, tribal members used
"prayer seats" located on the highest mountain peaks of the region to
"seek religious guidance or personal 'power' through 'engaging in
emotional [and] spiritual exchange with the creator.' " 15 9 Crucial participants in ceremonies such as the White Deerskin and Jump Dances
journeyed to the region prior to the ceremony in order to fabricate
medicines and to purify themselves. Medicine women visited the high
country to obtain "healing power" and to gather important
medicines. 160 Plaintiffs emphasized that the efficacy of such ceremonies depended strongly on the maintenance of "the solitude, quietness,
154. 635 F.2d at 175-77. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text. In short, the court
held that the government had a "compelling interest" in water storage and power generation,
such interest had been specifically articulated, and no less restrictive alternatives existed. Yet,
the court's holding that the government's interest was compelling even though it had not explicitly decided whether plaintiffs' practices had been burdened, suggests that it was not applying the
Yoder balancing analysis in a truly comparative manner. See notes 190-92 infra and accompanying text.
155. 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted
sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987).
156. 565 F. Supp. at 589-91. Plaintiffs also based their action on a variety of other statutes,
including the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996. See notes 197201 infra and accompanying text.
157. 565 F. Supp. at 591.
158. 565 F. Supp. at 591. Available evidence indicated that approximately 110-140 tribal
members used the high country for religious purposes. The number of users was difficult to
estimate because some of the ceremonies could only be carried out secretly. 565 F. Supp. at 591
n.3. See also Echo-Hawk, Natural Resource Development on Public Lands: Strategies for Protection of First Amendment Rights, INDIAN LAW SUPPORT CENTER REP. Oct. 1983, at 1, 9 (discussing need for maintaining privacy and confidentiality of testimony made by religious leaders
and practitioners).
159. 565 F. Supp. at 591.
160. 565 F. Supp. at 591-92. Unlike Western philosophies and religions, which generally
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and pristine environment found in the high country." 161
Plaintiffs asserted that construction of the section of road and the
allowance of timber harvesting would violate their free exercise rights
in several ways. First, the road would "dissect the high country," diminishing the region's inherent sacredness. 162 In addition to noise
arising from the construction and use of the road, its visibility from
the peaks would destroy the "pristine visual conditions" necessary for
performance of plaintiffs' religious ceremonies. Similarly, intensive
harvesting of timber would result in serious "adverse visual, aural, and
environmental impacts . . . on the high country's salient religious
characteristics." 163
The district court upheld plaintiffs' free exercise claims, enjoining
road construction and timbering in the high country. 164 Although the
court reached a different result, its method of applying the Yoder analysis did not vary greatly from the approach used by courts in earlier
cases.
In determining whether the proposed government actions placed a
burden on plaintiffs' religious practices, the court relied on Sequoyah 's
centrality standard. It noted that the high country comprised the.
"center of the spiritual world" of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa
tribes, and that "[n]o other geographic areas or sites hold equivalent
religious significance for these tribes." 165 Indeed, maintenance of the
region's pristine qualities was "central and indispensable" to the performance of plaintiffs' religious ceremonies. 166 Since use of the high
country was central to plaintiffs' religious practices, and the proposed
road and timbering interfered with such usage, the government had
improperly burdened plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. 167 The court
distinguished the results in earlier cases such as Sequoyah by holding
that the current plaintiffs had made a stronger factual showing of centrality than had their counterparts in those cases.16s
perceive power in relational terms, the Indian practitioners seemed to regard power as a tangible
substance which could be obtained and subsequently channeled toward healing.
161. 565 F. Supp. at 591.
162. 565 F. Supp. at 592.
163. 565 F. Supp. at 592 & n.6.
164. 565 F. Supp. at 596·97, 606.
165. 565 F. Supp. at 594. Thus, the court seemed to recognize the intrinsic sacredness of the
region.
166. 565 F. Supp. at 594.
167. 565 F. Supp. at 594-95. Critical to the court's finding of a burden on plaintiffs' religious
practices was its acknowledgment that "[t]he religious integrity of the high country rests on the
pristine qualities of the entire area rather than on just a few individual sites." 565 F. Supp. at 592
n.6. Moreover, even the Forest Service conceded that "[i]ntrusions on the sanctity of the Blue
Creek high country are ..• potentially destructive of the very core of Northwest [Indian] religious beliefs and practices." 565 F. Supp. at 595. Cf. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 744-45
(where the court rejected the assertion that the region as a whole was sacred); see also note 121

supra.
168. 565 F. Supp. at 595.
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Turning to the balancing part of its analysis, the court found that
the government had failed to demonstrate the compelling interests
necessary to justify such an infringement on plaintiffs' free exercise of
religion. The extra section of the road would not materially improve
access to timber resources existing in the Blue Creek Unit, and thus
would not lead to any increase in the number of jobs in the local timber industry.1 69 Because the Forest Service was currently able to provide all required services to the high country, the road was not
necessary to "improve the efficient administration" of the region.1 7o
Similarly, the court noted that the timber contained in the high
country constituted a small portion of all the timber located in the
entire Six Rivers National Forest. The harvesting of such timber
would not greatly alter supplies; nor would the local timber industry
suffer if it was denied access to timber in the region. Furthermore, the
court held that even if the government could show a substantial need
for harvesting more timber in the Blue Creek Unit, it could use
"means less restrictive of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights" to satisfy
those goals. m
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court opinion. In a narrowly written decision, the Ninth Circuit approved the district court's reliance on the Sequoyah centrality standard. Quoting extensively from the district court opinion, the Ninth
Circuit held that the district court's findings that there was a burden
on plaintiffs' religious practices and that the government's interest did
not outweigh this religious interest were not clearly erroneous. 172
C. Problems with the Sacred Site Cases

This section of the Note considers several common problems that
arise from courts' extension of the Yoder analysis to the sacred site
context. 173 Part IV then proposes a way of adapting Yoder so that
these problems are avoided.
1. Burdens on Sites and Practices

As the preceding sections demonstrate, significant analytical
problems are engendered by the use of the centrality standard to determine burdens, as was mandated by Sequoyah. As an initial matter, the
courts unduly exaggerated portions of Yoder and the earlier Indian
religion cases. For example, while Yoder provided that the impor169. 565 F. Supp. at 595-96.
170. 565 F. Supp. at 596.
171. 565 F. Supp. at 596-97.
172. 764 F.2d 581, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in this case, 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987).
173. Since this section of the Note focuses only on problem areas, it omits discussion of
Yoder's threshold criteria besides the centrality inquiry. See notes 86-90 supra.
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tance of claimants' practices to their religious beliefs was just one
threshold issue involved in stating a free exercise claim, 174 courts in
cases such as Sequoyah transformed it into the sole mechanism for
determining whether plaintiffs' practices had been burdened, thereby
distorting the remainder of the Yoder analysis.175 Similarly, these
courts justified the centrality inquiry as deriving from language in earlier cases such as Frank and Woody. Yet those cases used the centrality language as simply one way to describe these results, and not as the
controlling standard for evaluating claimed infringements on religious
practices.176
Moreover, the overextension of the centrality standard raises some
larger policy questions regarding the propriety of judicial inquiries in
this area. To begin with, the courts' reliance on the centrality standard often conflicts with the well established principle prohibiting extensive judicial investigations of orthodoxy. 177 In Sequoyah, for
example, the court's finding that the Little Tennessee Valley was not
central or indispensable to Cherokee religious practices amounted to a
judicial conclusion regarding the relative merit of a given site and ceremonies performed thereon to the Cherokee religion. 178 In rejecting
plaintiffs' contention that the mountain as a whole and not just the
Snow Bowl region was sacred, the Wilson court may well have inquired too far into the merits of Navajo beliefs themselves (as opposed
to merely examining the sincerity with which those beliefs were
held). 179
174. See notes 24-32 supra and accompanying text.
175. See Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 329 n.119 (arguing that the sacred site courts' reliance on centrality as the primary means for ascertaining
whether a burden exists on plaintiffs' practices is especially inappropriate since "[n]one of the
major non-Indian religion cases have mentioned centrality"); Note, Indian Religious Freedom,
supra note 89, at 1463 (pointing out the "methodological gap between standard free exercise
analysis and Indian site·specific religious belief").
176. See notes 48·68 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 324 (describing how the centrality approach, first used as an
attempt to explain the unfamiliar, "hardened into an ironclad requirement").
177. This principle was stated by the Supreme Court in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[i]fthere is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion"); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("religious beliefs need not
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection"); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("[I]t is no business of courts to say
that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of
the First Amendment.").
178. See notes 88-106 supra and accompanying text. Cf Note, Indian Religious Freedom,
supra note 89, at 1461 (warning that the centrality inquiry in the site cases has impermissibly
"evolved into an examination of the 'doctrinal pedigree' of a religious belief").
179. See notes 103-25 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, even if courts attempted to
use centrality to evaluate the bona fides of claimants' religious practices and beliefs, it is not clear
that they would be institutionally capable of doing so. See Note, Religious Exemptions Under the
Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 360 n.60 (1980)
[hereinafter Note, Religious Exemptions] (commenting that identifying the "essence of [a] particular religion [is] difficult even for theologians; religions have survived loss of even apparently
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A second problem with the centrality inquiry is that it prompts
judges who are usually educated in Judeo-Christian religions to depend on "familiar criteria" in evaluating qualitatively different Indian
religions.1 80 Courts in Woody and Frank properly used such familiar
criteria in explaining and understanding the Indian religions involved
in those cases. 181 By contrast, the sacred site cases suggest that unless
the relationship of site, practice, and belief accord with the JudeoChristian model, Indian plaintiffs will probably be denied free exercise
protection. For example, the Inupiat court's difficulty in perceiving a
religious practice that occurred upon superjacent sea ice as legitimate
no doubt contributed to its denial of plaintiffs' claims. 182 Evaluating
Indian religions solely in terms of their Judeo-Christian counterparts
is not only unworkable, but again seems to violate the principle against
judicial determinations of orthodoxy. 183
Moreover, the use of familiar criteria as a means of evaluating sacred site claims raises a unique problem in sacred site cases. In considering various sacred site claims, courts focused on the availability of
alternative areas in which plaintiffs could perform their ceremonies. 184
Since access to specific sites is far less important in Judeo-Christian
religions than in Indian religions, courts may well view plaintiffs as
being required merely to move from one outdoor "church" to another.
fundamental features") (citing M. KONVITZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 77-79
(1968)).
180. See Note, Religious Exemptions, supra note 179, at 360 n.60 ("[a]mong the dangers
inherent in [reliance on] the 'centrality' inquiry is the natural tendency to use familiar criteria
taken from general experience"); Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at
157 n.91 ("[C]ourts often compare unconventional beliefs to theistic beliefs in determining their
religious character.").
181. See notes 48-68 supra and accompanying text. One commentator points out that in
Woody the court "referred to centrality to explain how that unfamiliar practice fit into an unfamiliar religion, and why prohibiting the use of peyote would violate the Indians' free exercise
rights" and yet this "attempt to explain the unfamiliar ... hardened into an ironclad requirement
in later Indian cases." Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 324.
182. See note 103 supra and accompanying text. This problem is further illustrated by an
exchange in the district court opinion in Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977),
affd., 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). Questioning the relationship between the Rainbow Bridge Monument and plaintiffs' religious practices, the district court
noted that a small number of individuals had carried out infrequent religious ceremonies in the
area. Plaintiffs countered that Navajo ceremonies "are not periodic ceremonies .•• [but] are
performed when needed, and requested by an individual or family." 455 F. Supp. at 646. Despite
this contention, the district court held that the small number of ceremonies performed in the
region in part justified the denial of plaintiffs' claims. Its reliance on familiar patterns of church
attendance made the court insensitive to plaintiffs' arguments.
183. See Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1461 (the centrality inquiry promotes a narrowing of "the scope of free exercise protection to familiar and well-documented
religious tenets, despite the Supreme Court's statement that the First Amendment knows no
orthodoxy") (footnote omitted).
184. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983),
where the court noted that although development would impair practices carried on in the Snow
Bowl area, plaintiffs would still have free access to the rest of the Peaks for collecting herbs and
objects, and performing ceremonies. See notes 103-26 supra and accompanying text.
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Yet, this familiar analogy is misleading. One commentator on Indian
religions has noted that:
[O]nce a site is chosen by the gods as a place of sacred value, that sacredness continues to reside there for eternity and cannot be annulled (by
mere transportation by humans to another location). Sacred places transcend human history and are places of inexhaustible power and spiritual
energy. They are not merely sites of convenience. 18 5

Consideration of alternative sites is thus often meaningless unless it is
conducted from the perspective of the Indian religion itself. 186
2. Balancing Indian Religious Interests Against Government
Development Interests
In Sherbert and Yoder, the Supreme Court set out guidelines for
assessing governmental interests offered to justify disputed regulations.
The Court provided that only "compelling state interests" which were
concretely articulated could override claimants' free exercise rights.
Moreover, the government also had to demonstrate that no less restrictive means for achieving its interests existed. 187 This method of
analysis was accurately and fully applied by the court in Northwest. 188
While the other courts that reached the balancing stage of the analysis
mostly followed Yoder's guidelines, 189 their analysis has often been
problematic.
First, courts have failed to keep separate their consideration of Indian and government interests. For example, in Badoni the court
found that the government's interest in maintaining the reservoir at a
high level was compelling even though it had not first decided whether
plaintiffs' religious practices had been burdened. This suggests that
the court believed that the governmental interest was sufficient to
override any possible religious interest that plaintiffs might advance. 19°
This invocation of a "predetermined overriding governmental interest" 191 ignores the comparative quality of the balancing approach.
185. D. Carrasco, Sacred Space and Religious Vision in World Religions: A Context to
Understand the Religious Claims of the Kootenai Indians, 11 (unpublished manuscript, attained
from Native American Rights Fund) (emphasis added).
186. Part IV of this Note argues that courts should evaluate the strength of Indian claimants'
religious interests from the viewpoint of the religion involved.
187. See notes 16-18 & 36 supra and accompanying text.
188. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 594-97
(N.D. Cal. 1983), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987); see notes 169-72 supra and accompanying text.
189. Two other cases where courts reached the balancing stage of the Yoder analysis were
Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), ajfd., 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983), and Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), ajfd., 638 F.2d 172
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
190. See notes 141-54 supra and accompanying text.
191. Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1456 n.37.
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Under Yoder, governmental interests are not measured according to
an absolute standard; rather, the court's assessment of the governmental interest is colored by its simultaneous consideration of the burdened religious practices. By refusing to ascertain whether a burden
existed on plaintiffs' practices, and if so, the extent of burden present,
the Badoni court improperly applied the balancing analysis. 192
Second, courts attempting to determine whether less restrictive
means exist are often hampered by the timing of sacred site litigation.
If the action is not brought until the government project has been
mostly completed, the inquiry is unlikely to uncover truly viable alternative means. 193 This timing problem in part explains the different
results reached in Badoni and Northwest. In Badoni, the less restrictive means analysis was performed after the dam and reservoir had
been completed, and the demands of the multi-state water storage system made clear that the reservoir would have to be maintained at its
existing high level. Since an established project was almost by definition less costly and more efficient than any possible alternative, the
court's consideration of less restrictive means was not fruitful. 194 By
contrast, in Northwest the less restrictive means analysis was performed before the road was built or timbering had commenced, when
truly workable alternatives existed.195
192. See Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights. supra note 89, at 174 (the Badoni court
"merely assumed that the Glen Canyon project as implemented justified an abridgement of religious rights. . . . However, without analyzing the nature and content of Navajo interests, this
court could not have compared the importance of these interests with the costs of adopting
alternative means."). The balancing analysis performed by the court in Crow was also marred by
the court's failure to engage in the balancing required by Yoder. See note 142 supra.
193. One commentator points out that "analyzing alternatives after the government expends
substantial resources exaggerates, for first amendment purposes, the government's interest in
building a project on sacred lands. The government will automatically satisfy its burden of proof
whenever the controversy involves a substantially completed project." Note, Natfre America/I
Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 176. Part IV of the Note tempers this argument somewhat; it suggests that government accommodation of Indian religious interests may be possible at
every stage of the development except for final completion of the project. See note 230 infra and
accompanying text.
194. Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), a.ffd., 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); see notes 141-62 supra and accompanying text; see also
Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 333 (in Badoni, "[W]here
accommodation would have meant both a complete win for the Indians and a complete loss for
the government, the courts were reluctant to apply the tests in a way that would mandate
accommodation.").
195. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal.
1983), modified, 164 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987); see notes 155-72 supra and accompanying
text. Similarly, although it did not formally reach the balancing analysis, the court in Sequoyah
seemed to be influenced by the large amount of government resources that had already been
devoted to the Tellico Dam project. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 610
(E.D. Tenn. 1979), a.ffd., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); see note 102

supra.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Legislative Developments
Legislatures and administrative agencies may be as well equipped
as courts to resolve conflicts between Indian religious interests and
government developmental interests, particularly when an issue is
raised prior to government construction of the project. 196 Several recent statutes seek to provide Indian sacred sites with some measure of
protection from government development.
For example, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act197 provides that as of 1978 "it shall be the policy of the United States to
protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise [their] traditional religions ...
including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and
traditional rights." 198 To achieve this goal, the Act requires administrative agencies to reexamine their procedures and policies, and alter
them where it is necessary to eliminate government interference with
Indian religious practices.199
Despite its protective language, however, the Act has not been a
controlling factor in the sacred site cases. Courts treat the Act simply
as a congressional recognition of Indians' free exercise rights that does
not provide plaintiffs with any independent protections. Thus, "where
a traditional free exercise analysis has been applied and either a lack of
infringement or an overriding governmental interest found, courts
have not felt obligated to enforce more than consultation with Indian
religious leaders by federal agencies." 200 In addition to restructuring
the Yoder analysis, clashes between Indian religious interests and gov196. The need for some type of legislative solution for sacred site issues may well become
more pressing in the immediate future. Section 2 of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
required the executive to prepare a report within a year from the statute's enactment that would,
among other things, identify sacred site problems in various regions. The report listed over two
hundred such problem areas. See AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Acr REPORT appendix C (1979).
197. Originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (current version at 42
u.s.c. § 1996 (1982)).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1996. The legislative history demonstrates Congress' increased sensitivity
to Indians' needs for undisturbed access to sacred sites in order to worship and collect objects
and medicines. "To deny access to them is analogous to preventing a non-Indian from entering
his church or temple." H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1262, 1263. For further discussion of the Act, see generally
Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 152-54; Note, Indian Worship v.
Government Development, supra note 89, at 320-21; Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note
89, at 1457-59.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1996. See also Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89,
at 151-52 & nn.71-72.
200. Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1458 (footnote omitted). For example, courts have held that the Act did not confer a private right of action on Indian plaintiffs. Id.
See also Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 153 ("[t]he Act does not
confer a right of action on Native Americans"); Note, Indian Worship v. Government Develop-
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ernment development interests might be alleviated by a strengthening
of the Act. 201
B. Adapting the Yoder Analysis to Sacred Site Context
1.

Threshold Criteria Other than Centrality

The Yoder analysis requires claimants to demonstrate that they
sincerely follow an actual religion and that the practices for which
they seek protection are based on religious, as opposed to cultural or
historical, concerns. 202 These threshold criteria should be retained in
the sacred lands context. They did not create undue disputes in the
cases, 203 and indeed they contributed positively to free exercise analysis. For example, the threshold criteria strain out frivolous actions
where parties attempt to use first amendment claims as a guise to
block development they actually oppose for nonreligious reasons. 204
Furthermore, by clearly satisfying these criteria, Indian plaintiffs may
well add a measure of legitimacy to their claims. 2os
2. Burdens on Sites and Practices

a. Limiting the centrality inquiry. Preceding sections demonstrated that courts have often misapplied Yoder's centrality standard
in the sacred site cases. The seeming unfairness which has resulted
from such misapplication can only be avoided in the future if the centrality inquiry is restored to the limited threshold function initially
ment, supra note 89, at 328 (discussing court's finding that "the Act was not meant to grant
rights in excess of first amendment guarantees").
201. In a recent case one court appears to have given greater weight to AIRFA. In United
States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247, 266-69 (D.S.D. 1985), the district court found that a Forest
Service official's failure to consult meaningfully with Indian religious leaders regarding a special
use permit for the Black Hills conflicted with AIRFA; the court concluded that denial of the
permit was arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, the AIRFA Report recounts several instances
where the Act prompted Indian tribes and a governmental agency to reach a compromise agreement concerning access to sacred sites. AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Acr REPORT
55-58 (1979). See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE§§ 5097.9-.99 (Deering 1984 & 1986 Supp.) (establishing a moratorium on the disturbance of Indian burial grounds and creating a task force to
identify archeological and historical sites in consultation with tribal representatives); EchoHawk, supra note 158, at 7 (after noting that "[i]n instances where practitioners have sacred
areas located on public lands which are not in imminent danger, tribes should consider lobbying
for protective legislation," the author lists a variety of existing federal statutes that could be
interpreted so as to provide for protection of sacred sites); Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra
note 89, at 1457 n.49.
202. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
203. For example, the parties often stipulated that plaintiffs meet these threshold criteria.
See note 86 supra.
204. An analogous problem occurred in the cases involving peyote use by members of the
Native American Church, where non-Indians sought to take advantage of the Church's exemption under the drug laws. See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
205. Cf Echo-Hawk, supra note 158, at 8 (noting that it is crucial for Indian advocates to
convince judges of the nature and gravity of their sacred site claims).
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outlined in Yoder. 206 Instead of controlling the analysis, the centrality
inquiry would operate simply as one way for the court to examine the
asserted connection between a particular site and plaintiffs' religious
practices.
The recent case of United States v. Means 207 is a good example of
this more limited approach. In Means, a group of Indians established
a religious campsite on public lands located in the Black Hills National Forest. The Forest Service denied the group a special use permit and sought a court order directing them to leave the site.208 While
the district court engaged in a centrality inquiry, it stressed that centrality was just part of, and not determinative of, its analysis. 209
If the problems arising from the courts' earlier use of the standard
are to be avoided entirely, the courts must inquire into centrality from
the viewpoint of the Indian religion involved. As one commentator
noted, "[i]f the focus is to be one of centrality, it becomes essential that
courts inquire into the significance of governmental actions in the context of the affected religion." 210 This approach is particularly needed
here, insofar as Indian religious practices and beliefs are so unfamiliar
to judges and lawyers raised in the Judea-Christian tradition.
206. Yoder provided that centrality was one of several threshold criteria, and was not to
determine a court's analysis. See notes 22-32 supra and accompanying text. Another way to
avoid the problems caused by misapplication of the centrality standard is, of course, to eliminate
the standard entirely.
207. 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985).
208. 627 F. Supp. at 249.
209. The court outlined a series of questions necessary to address properly the free exercise
claim. These questions included:
I. Is the idea that the Black Hills are sacred a sincerely held religious belief?
2(a). If yes to No. 1, is the Black Hills central or indispensable to the performance of
particular religious practices?
(b). If yes to No. l, is the YTC [camp]site central or indispensable to the performance of
particular religious practices?
3(a). If yes to No. 2(a) and YTC [campsite] is not central do the Lakota have access to
other areas and is their conduct in those areas sufficiently free from regulation so that
their religious practices are not burdened?
(b) lfYTC [campsite] is central, do the Lakota have access to the site and is their conduct in performing their religious practices sufficiently free from government regulation so as not to be burdened?
627 F. Supp. at 261 (emphasis added). Question 3(a) demonstrates that the Means court did not
view the centrality inquiry as dispositive, and indeed accepted that even noncentral sites might
warrant free exercise protection. The court ultimately held that the Forest Service's regulations
and policies violated the free exercise clause, and that its denial of the special permit was arbitrary and capricious. 627 F. Supp. at 269.
210. Note, Indian Religious Freedom, supra note 89, at 1461. The author adds that in the
sacred site cases courts' "focus must shift to the role of the site in native worship." Id. See also
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Acr REPORT 57-58 (1979) (commending an agreement worked out between a group oflndians and the Bureau of Land Management for approaching the sacred site issue from the tribe's perspective); Echo-Hawk, supra note 158, at 8 (from the
Indian advocate's perspective "[i]t is critical to educate and sensitize the presiding judge or trier
of fact about the unique nature of Indian religion in terms he can understand"); Note, Indian
Worship v. Govemment Development, supra note 89, at 335 (arguing that courts must develop
familiarity with Indian religious practices and beliefs regarding sacred lands so that they can
address them "on their own terms").
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b. Focusing on actual burdens. With the centrality inquiry carefully limited, courts could then properly follow Sherbert and Yoder,
and conduct the burden analysis by focusing on actual interferences
with claimants' religious practices. For example, in Sherbert the
Supreme Court held that by forcing the appellant to choose between
following the tenets of her religion and foregoing benefits, or abandoning one of the precepts of her religion to obtain benefits, the state
imposed a burden on her free exercise rights. 211 Thus, to satisfy the
burden requirement, appellant simply had to demonstrate that the
state regulation, as a practical matter, interfered significantly with the
exercise of her religion. She did not have to show that the state action
would totally prevent her from practicing her religion.
Similarly, in Yoder the Court held that since the compulsory education law exposed Amish children to worldly influences, attitudes,
and goals that conflicted with their beliefs and impaired the adolescent
child's integration into the Amish community, it amounted to a burden on defendants' religious practices. 212 The Court again stressed the
practical interference with defendants' free exercise of their religion. 21 3
The emphasis on actual burdens on claimants' religious practices
could be readily transferred to the sacred site context. The analysis of
the district court in United States v. Means 214 illustrates this method.
After completing a limited centrality inquiry, 2 15 the Means court addressed whether the Forest Service restrictions on use of and access to
the Black Hills burdened the Lakota Indians' free exercise rights. It
noted that:
The Supreme Court has not set forth a precise test for determining
whether or not a burden exists. To answer this question, a court or
agency must take a sensible and realistic look at the facts and circumstances of the case and then decide whether there.exists a real negative
impact upon the exercise of religion that is significant enough to be labeled a burden. 216

Applying this formulation, the court held that because the Forest Service regulations restricted "when, where, and how the ceremonies are
conducted" 217 in the Black Hills, they imposed "a significant negative
211. 374 U.S. at 404. The Court added that the regulations interfered with "cardinal principles" of appellant's religion. 374 U.S. at 406. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
212. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
213. Having found a burden on defendants' religious practices, the Court proceeded to describe the character of that burden, noting that the compulsory education law posed the "very
real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today."
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972). See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
214. 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985).
215. See notes 207-09 supra and accompanying text.
216. 627 F. Supp. at 258.
217. 627 F. Supp. at 263. Specifically, the regulations restricted the location of claimants'
religious campsite, and limited the manner in which their ceremonies were conducted. The Forest Service also imposed a fee for use of the region. 627 F. Supp. at 253-54, 263.
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impact" on the Lakota religious practices, which satisfied the burden
requirement. 218
Indian plaintiffs ill sacred site cases would probably be more successful in meeting the practical burden standard than they have been
under the previous approach. 219 Yet, because the standard ultimately
depends on a factual, case-by-case inquiry, it would not result in an
undue expansion of the number of sacred site cases occupying the
courts. 220
3. Balancing Indian Religious Interests Against Government
Development Interests

Since Indian religious practitioners and government officials possess vastly and qualitatively different interests regarding sacred lands,
it is unhelpful for courts to consider the balancing analysis as a mere
"weighing" of rival concerns upon some equivalent "scale." 221
Rather, the court is in essence rendering a value judgment that resolves conflicts over land use in a particular situation. The balancing
analysis should primarily serve to guide the court in understanding
and comparing the various interests so that it can best make such
judgments. 222
a. Indian religious interests. In the sacred site cases, plaintiffs have
asserted a variety of interferences with their free exercise rights: they
218. 627 F. Supp. at 263. The Means court's practical approach to the burden analysis is
analogous to the "coercive effects" standard advanced by the court in Crow v. Gullet, 541 F.
Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), ajfd., 106 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983). Cf. notes 126-40 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 335 (arguing that in making burden determinations courts
should accept at "face value [Indian] assertions as to the importance of and infringement on that
practice").
219. For example, the flooding of sacred lands and concomitant denial of access for performance of ceremonies presented in Sequoyah and Badoni would probably satisfy this practical burden standard. See Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note 89, at 323
(questioning how courts failed to find a burden "despite the fact that in two of the cases [Sequoyah and Badoni] plaintiffs became completely unable to reach sacred sites"); Note, Native
American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 169 ("[r]eligious abridgment occurs whenever
government action frustrates protected religious practice.").
220. Cf. Echo-Hawk, supra note 158, at 8 (recognizing that "[t]hough the exact legal standards are not well defined, it is clear that the First Amendment test as developed in this context
is a factual test"). Because of the potential number of sacred site cases, see note 196 supra, it is
appropriate for courts, Indian advocates, and government officials to be sensitive to the floodgates problem. The factual grounding of the burden analysis as formulated in Means, for example, avoids most floodgate problems. See also Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development,
supra note 89, at 333-34.
221. The "scale" metaphor is particularly troubling because it implies that to prevail on an
uncertain free exercise claim all Indian plaintiffs need do is "add" another fact to their side by
showing another religious use for the site. This obscures the fact that the court is ultimately
making a value judgment.
222. This view of the balancing process accords with the parameters established by the
Supreme Court in Yoder and Sherbert. See notes 14-36 supra and accompanying text. For example, in comparing the divergent interests the court will still require that the government have a
"compelling interest" in the development project.
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have argued that government activities destroyed the intrinsically holy
character of the site, inhibited practitioners from performing both infrequent and common ceremonies on sacred lands, prevented worshippers from collecting sacred herbs, objects, and medicines, and
diminished the general religious and cultural value of the region. 223
The first amendment mandates that a court consider the severity of
such alleged infringements from the perspective of the affected Indian
religion. 224 While a judge may personally believe, for example, that
the inability to obtain sacred eagle feathers does not particularly frustrate Indian religious practices, he should defer to the plaintiffs if they
offer sincere and good faith assertions to the contrary. 225 This process
allows the Indians themselves to participate in valuing a given site for
purposes of the balancing analysis. 226
b. Government development interests. After analyzing the extent
of infringement on plaintiffs' religious practices, the court should address the government interests asserted to justify the development project. Courts should follow the method outlined in Sherbert and Yoder,
which the court in Northwest recently extended to the sacred site context. 227 Pursuant to this method, the government must demonstrate a
"compelling interest" in the project. The government cannot simply
assert general interests in irrigation or economic development - the
need for a particular project at a particular site must be carefully
demonstrated. 228
223. This section assumes that Indian plaintiffs have already demonstrated an actual interference with their religious practices and the court is evaluating the degree of infringement which
exists. See notes 88-172 supra and accompanying text.
224. See Part I supra.
225. See United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247, 254 (D.S.D. 1985) (stressing the impor·
tance of taking into account "subjective criteria" of the Indian religion); Note, Indian Religious
Freedom, supra note 89, at 1469 (the balancing analysis should "assess the degree of harm
threatened to a traditional Indian religion by proposed development of a sacred site in the con·
text of the tribal religion itself"); Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development, supra note
89, at 335 (courts should assess Indian religious practices "in their own terms").
226. Viewed from the perspective of the Indian religion, the infringements may be of such
severity that few, if any, accommodations to development are possible. For example, plaintiffs
might assert that an entire region and not just part of it was highly important to their religious
practices and could not be disturbed. Compare Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), and notes 103-26 supra, with Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct. 1971
(1987), and notes 155-72 supra.
In the majority of the cases, however, the religion may well permit some form of compromise
with governmental development. See the discussion of Northwest at notes 155-72 supra (address·
ing the possibility of fashioning "protective zones"); see also Means, 627 F. Supp. at 259, 264
(religious practitioners willing to accept an alternative which granted them exclusive religious
use of only 800 acres within the Black Hills and precluded them from building any permanent
structures in the region).
227. 565 F. Supp. 586, 595-97; see notes 174-76, 188 supra and accompanying text.
228. See notes 187-89 supra and accompanying text. Courts could develop categories of in·
terests that have the potential for qualifying as "compelling." They could thus find that while
the construction of dams, water projects, or roads may in certain circumstances amount to com-
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Furthermore, Indian plaintiffs should file sacred site claims as rapidly as possible. Early filing will enable the court to focus on the possible existence of less restrictive means for achieving the government's
goals without having its analysis skewed by preexisting commitment of
substantial government resources to the project.229 If government
agencies learn that courts will employ a strict less restrictive means
standard, they may be more likely to consider viable alternatives when
they are initially planning the project.230
Finally, having determined the extent of infringement on plaintiffs'
religious practices from the perspective of the Indian religion, and
having analyzed the asserted compelling government interests in light
of less restrictive alternatives, the court should carefully compare the
rival interests. There may be situations where either party's interest,
when viewed on its own terms, is so strong that the court must find
entirely in favor of the Indians or entirely in favor of the government.
The court should focus, however, on achieving measured accommodations of the competing interests, and this focus should inform the
court's shaping of appropriate relief. 231
pelling interests, the expansion of a ski lodge, however it is justified, cannot constitute such an
interest. Compare Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980), Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
954 (1981), and Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 107 S. Ct.
1971 (1987), with Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983),
and notes 88-172supra and accompanying text. They could support such a position by focusing
on the Yoder Court's strong emphasis on the special character of the state's interest in education.
See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
229. See notes 193-95 supra and accompanying text. For example, in Northwest, because the
suit was filed before the projects were commenced, the court could consider protecting the high
country by altering the road's direction and limiting the regions where timbering could be carried
out. See notes 155-72 supra and accompanying text. Cf. United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp.
247, 264 (D.S.D. 1985) (considering less restrictive means before worshippers had constructed
any permanent structures at the 800 acre religious campsite and before the Forest Service had
targeted the area for other projects, the court concluded that the Forest Service could attain its
varied objectives on the remaining 1.5 million acres of the Black Hills).
However, one Indian advocate has noted that the interest of worshippers in maintaining the
secrecy of their religious practices may preclude early filing of claims. See Echo-Hawk, supra
note 158, at 9 (recommending measures that might be used to preserve the confidentiality of
Indian practices). Cf. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980), discussed at notes 88-103 supra (early filing inhibited since plaintiffs
were not aware of the exact location of Chota until after TVA completed an archaeological
project).
230. A strict less restrictive means inquiry may thus prompt the intensive consultation between tribal leaders and government agencies envisioned in the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. See notes 197-201 supra and accompanying text. Even partial construction of the
project, however, should not preclude some type of less restrictive means analysis. See, e.g.,
Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights, supra note 89, at 173-74. The author notes that
although at one point substantial funds had been appropriated for the Tellico Dam at issue in
Sequoyah, "legislative history indicate[d] that a decision to forego construction probably would
not have appreciably harmed the government's interest in developing power supplies." Id. at
173.
231. For example, the Means court, considering the appropriate relief for the first amendment violation, noted that it was "not in a position to nor does it want to draw the blueprints for
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CONCLUSION

The sacred site cases provide a vivid example of courts attempting
to apply conventional free exercise analysis to a new and unfamiliar
setting. So far such attempts have been incomplete and at times unduly harmful to Indian religious concerns. The courts' use of centrality exceeds the inquiry required by Yoder and the earlier Indian
religion cases, conflicts with the principle against judicial determinations of orthodoxy, and encourages improper reliance on familiar criteria as standards for measuring sacred site claims. Moreover, courts'
efforts at balancing Indian religious interests and government development interests do not take into account the different natures of the two
sets of interests, and are frequently conducted too late in the development process for evaluation of less restrictive alternatives to be
meaningful.
Several modifications to conventional free exercise analysis will
remedy these problems. Most significantly, once the centrality inquiry
is restored to its original limited role, courts will properly be able to
focus on actual interferences with religious practices, as they are perceived from the perspective of the Indian religion. They will then be
able to compare carefully such interferences with asserted compelling
governmental interests, while paying particular attention to existing
less restrictive alternatives. In short, these modifications will be relatively easy for courts to implement, and will ensure fairer and more
consistent consideration of American Indians' important religious
concerns.

- Mark S. Cohen
a Lakota religious camp." 627 F. Supp. 247, 271 (D.S.D. 1985). Instead, the court required the
parties to work out an acceptable compromise regarding Lakota religious practices in the Black
Hills, and specified that no appeals could be taken until such relief had been arranged. 627 F.
Supp. at 271-72.

